Revisions to rationality:the translation of ‘new knowledges’ into policy under the Coalition Government by McGimpsey, Ian et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Revisions to rationality
McGimpsey, Ian; Bradbury, Alice; Santori, Diego
DOI:
10.1080/01425692.2016.1202747
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
McGimpsey, I, Bradbury, A & Santori, D 2017, 'Revisions to rationality: the translation of ‘new knowledges’ into
policy under the Coalition Government', British Journal of Sociology of Education, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 908-925.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2016.1202747
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal of Sociology of Education on 4th July 2016,
available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01425692.2016.1202747
Checked 3/8/2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
1 
 
Revisions to rationality: the translation of ‘new knowledges’ into policy 
under the Coalition Government  
This article gives an account of the use of knowledges from emerging scientific fields 
in education and youth policy making under the Coalition government (2010-15) in the 
UK. We identify a common process of ‘translation’ and offer three illustrations of 
policy-making in the UK that utilise diverse knowledges produced in academic fields 
(neuroscience, network theory and well-being). This production of ‘new knowledges’ 
in policy contexts allows for the identification of sites of policy intervention. This 
process of translation underlies a series of diverse revisions of the rational subject of 
policy. Collectively, these revisions amount to a change in policy-making and the 
emergence of a different subject of neoliberal policy. This subject is not an excluded 
alterity to an included rational subject of neoliberalism, but a ‘plastic subject’ 
characterised by its multiplicity. The plastic subject does not contradict the rational 
subject as central to neoliberal policy-making, but diversifies it.   
Keywords: rationality; networks; neuroscience; well-being; neoliberalism 
Introduction 
This paper explores the use of knowledge from emerging scientific fields in education and 
youth policy with a focus on the period of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government in the UK (2010-15), and the relation of these ‘translations’ to the representation 
of the subject of policy as rational. We argue that, in combination with the use of behavioural 
economics in policy discourse, this amounts to a revision of the rational subject of policy, one 
of the core tenets of liberalism including neoliberalism. This paper develops ideas from our 
previous work (Bradbury, McGimpsey, and Santori 2013) by illustrating a further series of 
translations of knowledge from emerging scientific fields into policy making and arguing that 
cumulatively they effect a qualitative change to the subject as a site of regulatory 
intervention. Ultimately, we suggest that this is a discursive shift that functions as a means of 
sustaining a neoliberal policy regime in education.  
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This discussion is set in the UK political context of 2015, following the election of a 
Conservative administration and looking back on five years of Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government. During this period market-based concepts held a 
contradictory place in policy making. The UK government broke the state’s monopoly over 
the supply of schooling through an acceleration of the diversification of suppliers and types 
of school (DfE 2013) while our illustrations demonstrate a simultaneous increase in 
prescription. This ‘hybrid model’ of centrally directed policy implementation and more 
networked and devolved modes of ‘policy realisation’ (Grek 2013, 859-861) poses questions 
about the resilience of the rational choosing subject - a central figure in policy-making - 
within large-scale systems of choosing such as school selection. Such questions are central to 
the reconfiguration of neoliberal policy-making following the financial crisis, and to attempts 
to resolve the contradictions within neoliberal political-economy that this crisis exposed. The 
purpose of this article is to consider the implications of such ‘late neoliberal’ (McGimpsey 
2016) policy making with respect to representations of the subject of policy in education and 
youth policy.  
Below we offer a short series of illustrations of the translation of new knowledges in 
education and youth policy that draw on neuroscience, concepts of well-being, and network 
theory. These illustrations by no means represent the extent of incorporation of knowledges 
from emerging scientific fields in policy, but are used to explore the processes by which new 
knowledges work within and are worked by policy-making processes.   
The translation of new knowledges 
Education policy sociological work has taken up post-structural notions of intertextuality and 
recontextualisation, notably through influential notions of the ‘policy cycle’ whereby policy 
is understood to be produced and productive multiply and iteratively in non-linear processes 
across contexts of influence, text production and practice (Bowe, Ball, and Gold 1992). 
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Recent policy-based research has examined such recontextualising processes within contexts 
of practice through the notion of ‘enactment’ (Maguire, Ball, and Braun 2010, Bradbury 
2011, 2013, Ball et al. 2011, Braun, Maguire, and Ball 2010) or across national territories in 
transnational processes of policy borrowing (Cromby and Willis 2014, Ishkanian 2014). 
‘Translation’ as we use it here operates with these broader post-structural assumptions of 
education policy sociological research in mind, but is focused on the shifting relations of 
knowledge to policy whereby emerging scientific knowledges and policy production are 
‘fused’ (Riddell 2013), in processes that have inevitable implications for the representation of 
the subject of policy within policy discourse. Again, working with the established terms of 
post-structural policy analysis, the significance of such a change is that it is not simply 
discursive, but will have effects on the constitution of the subjects named by and represented 
within policy (Youdell 2006, Ball 2006b).We use the term ‘new knowledges’ here 
specifically to refer to formations within the field of policy making (we might have said ‘new 
policy knowledges’ were it not so cumbersome). These new knowledges are comprised of 
articulated sets of concepts and ‘facts’, typically originating (or seemingly originating) in 
named fields of academic work, and that are circulated in contexts of policy influence and 
policy production (Ball 2006a, 51, Bowe, Ball, and Gold 1992) by means of networked think 
tank researchers and academic gurus, and highly consumable reports, books, speeches and so 
on. These knowledges are often presented as entirely new, very credible, homogenous in their 
conclusions, and disruptive of existing ideas within policy-making, while simultaneously 
being circulations by which policy network membership is established and maintained. The 
establishment of these sets of ideas in policy making as both ‘new’ and as ‘knowledges’ is 
part of our concern here, particularly in relation to the purpose this novelty and credibility 
serves within the policy- making arena.  
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The emerging scientific knowledges that have been subject to successful translations 
in late neoliberal policy making are further notable in that they challenge the ‘rational 
subject’ as a central element in neoliberal political discourse. Neoliberal modes of policy 
making have been characterised by a particular productive relation of the market to 
subjectivity such that subjects of neoliberalism must be produced as ‘rational’(Olssen 1996, 
340). In the phase of policy making that has followed the financial crisis, translations have 
served to diversify the productive force of policy discourse, enabling the address of 
alternative subjects such that the ‘irrational’ is no longer the excluded other of policy, but an 
object of the productivity of neoliberal policy (though clearly not the only object). That is, it 
is via these translations that ‘within the neoliberal regime a new knowledge of the subject is 
being constituted, one that is of the limited effectiveness of neoliberal policy technologies in 
constituting subjects as rational’ (Bradbury, McGimpsey, and Santori 2013, 250), with 
concomitant changes in the means and ends of governance.  
Having previously argued for the constitution of such a new knowledge in an 
emerging hybrid field of psychology and economics, below we present three further 
illustrations of new knowledges and their use in policy, under the headings of neuroscience, 
wellbeing and network theory. Our approach to researching these formations and their 
functioning has taken the form of an analysis of documents produced by a wide range of 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, as well as academic and press comment on these 
developments. The variety of sources we draw on reflects our conception of new knowledges 
as formations that articulate within policy-making. Nevertheless, we preserve a particular 
focus in our analysis on the popular texts and think tank reports that in the UK policy context 
figure significantly in the work of translation from a field of typically academic knowledge 
production into contexts of policy influence and production. Each new knowledge illustrated 
has a basis in an academic discipline which serves to legitimise policy claims; however in 
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‘translation’ into policy, claims tend to become narrower, and more singular, definitive and 
generalised than those of their antecedent academic field.  
As a result, the links between the ideas used in policy implementation and academic 
research vary. In the case of neuroscience, for example, there is tension between some 
academic neuroscientists and the way in which evidence is used in policy. In the case of 
behavioural economics, we see a key popular text, ‘Nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2009), 
serving as a synthesis (or perhaps shorthand) for a body of knowledge, with several 
peripheral texts reinforcing this main text’s message. Accompanying such a text is often a 
prominent ‘guru’, who has come to embody the new knowledge and may be involved in 
policy bodies. The positioning of Richard Thaler within the UK government’s Behavioural 
Insight Unit (recently reconstituted as an independent social enterprise) is a good example of 
this.  In other knowledges a group of academics or a research centre may fulfil this ‘guru 
function’, as a highly consumable object that seems to encapsulate the knowledge. Our 
analysis is an attempt to follow these processes of translation
2
, as academic debates and 
knowledge production are recontextualised and rearticulated into policy possibilities and 
principles that can be represented in policy texts and to public audiences in the mainstream 
press.  
To say ‘we attempt to follow a process of translation’ does not imply a conception of 
translation as a unidirectional, linear process. Translations involve, for example, the 
establishment of government bodies or a government-funded university research centre that 
seek to promote policy oriented research within the academic field (Burgess 2012). In a 
higher education environment where funding and prestige is linked to ‘impact’, there is 
undeniably a reciprocal relationship between the academic and policy worlds, with 
researchers’ careers and status elevated by the translation of their work into policy tools, and 
a resulting continuation of research in similar areas. Academic research may legitimise policy 
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claims, but government funding and policy take-up legitimises academic research. There are 
often returns of the new knowledge to its ‘roots’ in an academic field. 
We are further concerned, as noted above, to continue to explore the relationship of 
new knowledges to the subjects of policy. How do these new knowledges result in policy 
addressing a different subject/the subject differently, and constituting different sites and 
modes of regulatory intervention? That is, through the three illustrations below we seek to 
argue that different knowledges in their translation into policy tend to delineate different 
objects, sites and means of policy intervention. Our focus is not on the scientific disciplines 
themselves, or on a critique of the validity of policy representations of the achievements of 
these fields.  
Neuroscience  
In this first illustration, we examine the translation of ideas from neuroscience into policy-
making, with a specific focus on its use in early intervention policies with children under five 
years. Neuroscience has been described as the great scientific development of our time, the 
revelations of which will affect numerous aspects of our lives. It encompasses numerous 
fields of inquiry into the brain and nervous system from neurology, psychology, 
pharmacology, physiology, anatomy, molecular biology (Rose and Rose 2012, 251). Though 
not new, its recent prominence is often related to scientific breakthroughs enabled by 
technological advances in genomics and informatics and new imaging techniques which have 
allowed the brain to be modelled (Rose and Rose 2012, 252, Goswami 2006, OECD 2008).  
Given the extraordinary scientific and cultural influence of neuroscience, it is 
unsurprising that there is an existing literature concerning its often problematic translation 
into policy (Rose and Rose, 2012, Goswami 2006, OECD 2008). Further, neuroscience has 
flourished in professional contexts of practice, such as in education, with ‘brain gym’ a 
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prominent example of the implementation of ‘insights’ into the classroom, or what Goswami 
refers to as ‘the widespread misapplication of science to education’ (2006, 2). The practice-
based use (or abuse) of neuroscience is, as we have noted, not our main concern here.  
However, this background is relevant to the extent that the prominence of neuroscience in 
popular culture and professional contexts is arguably a contributory factor in the 
establishment of neuroscience as a sound basis for policy decisions. 
To illustrate the impact of neuroscience on policy we focus on the early years sector, 
and specifically early intervention policy.  
Early intervention 
The early years sector (relating to services for children from birth to five years) has been 
subject to intense policy development throughout the 2000s and 2010s, in which 
neuroscience has had a significant influence. As with all ‘new knowledges’, there are echoes 
of past theories, which offer legitimacy and familiarity. Neuroscientific explanations relating 
to the appropriate development of children’s brains have been used in policies on childcare, 
health and social care provision, both within and alongside a dominant overarching discourse 
of human development as a scientifically observable phenomenon (Yelland 2008, Blaise 
2005, Dahlberg and Moss 2005)
4
. The discourse of ‘developmentally appropriate practice’ 
has been enlivened by the use of ‘insights’ from neuroscience, which have provided 
reassurance and credibility to this modernist perspective of children’s progress through 
developmental milestones. Moreover, neuroscience has recently been deployed explicitly in 
discussions of early intervention in children’s lives to prevent future problems. There are 
three dimensions of this adoption of neuroscience which are of interest in our analysis: the 
constitution of the family and the family environment as a key site of policy intervention; the 
constitution of the neurologically damaged child as a policy problem; and the justification of 
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spending on early intervention as a preventative measure based on principles of economic 
efficiency.  
Firstly, in discussions of early intervention, neuroscience is used to make links 
between environment and educational attainment, through which the family is constructed as 
a site of policy intervention. This link is prominently made in reports from the Centre for 
Social Justice (CSJ), a think tank founded by the former Conservative leader and, at the time 
of writing, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Iain Duncan-Smith. A 2011 report on 
educational exclusion made explicit links between children’s experiences in their early years, 
their brain development, and subsequent exclusion from school: 
The quality of a child’s primary caregiver’s support and nurture profoundly influences a 
child’s very early formative years. Their first three years are critical in terms of the 
brain’s social, emotional and physical development. Trauma affects the brain’s 
development and in turn a child’s behaviour and learning ability. (CSJ 2011, 14-15) 
This notion of a ‘critical period’ of brain development in the early years of a child’s life – for 
example, CSJ reports include the ‘fact’ that ‘a newborn’s brain is quarter the size of an 
adult’s, whereas by age three, it is 80 per cent formed’ (CSJ 2011, 56) – establishes the idea 
that children who have been fundamentally altered by their early experiences face educational 
exclusion. Quotes such as these demonstrate how it becomes possible to directly correlate 
‘trauma’ to ‘learning ability’ and future outcomes of social and economic exclusion; a 
correlation which in turn is used to justify early intervention in children’s lives by state 
agencies. In another earlier CSJ report, published with the Smith Institute, this link between 
educational attainment and ‘trauma’ is emphasised: 
[C]hildren exposed to chronic and unpredictable stress – a parent who lashes out in fury; 
an alcoholic who is kind one day and abusive the next – will suffer deficits in their ability 
to learn. As a result, their IQs will be lower; in itself, a risk factor for conduct problems. 
(Allen and Duncan Smith 2008, 60) 
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By representing a biological internalisation of a ‘bad’ family environment manifesting as 
diminished neurological capacity with respect social and emotional development and 
intelligence, such discussions i) locate the problem of educational exclusion (and other 
associated social problems) within the child whose brain has been affected by the ‘quality’ of 
the nurture received, and ii) constitute parents’ practices of care during the first three years of 
the child’s life as a causative factor in future outcomes. Thus, not only is the neurologically-
defined child figured as a policy problem, but neuroscience is used in the formation of a 
justificatory narrative for ‘early intervention’ in the family environment to prevent such 
supposedly irreparable damage.  
The idea that much is decided in the brain by the age of three (identified in an OECD 
report [2008] as a popular ‘neuromyth’), was repeated in reports produced by the Early 
Intervention Review Team under the Coalition government, which commented that in the 
first three years, ‘neglect, the wrong type of parenting and other adverse experiences can have 
a profound effect on how children are emotionally ‘wired’’ (Allen 2011b, 14). This tendency 
to see behaviour as determined by the brain is referred to by Rose and Rose as 
‘neuroessentialism’; here in their discussion of children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder:  
The child’s behaviour is no longer perceived as part of a relationship – between him […] 
and his school or parents – but as rooted in his brain [...] neuroessentialism maintains that 
behavioural outcomes are embedded in brain processes (Rose and Rose 2012, 270-271) 
This neuroessentialist approach (which as Nikolas Rose separately points out is far from the 
only neuroscientific conception of the brain (Rose 2013)), in constructing the neurologically 
damaged and so determined child as a policy problem, repositions the child as a subject of 
policy; different from other children and adults who can be assumed to be capable of making 
rational choices.  
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Although our focus is not on the veracity of these claims it is nonetheless important to 
note how the process of translation enables the extensive use of neuroscience ‘facts’ that are 
controversial in wider literature (Harris 2010). There has been criticism from the original 
researcher that the Centre for Social Justice ‘greatly misrepresented’ and ‘distorted’ findings 
based on children who had suffered extreme neglect in applying them to children brought up 
in poverty (Lewis and Bosely 2010). In the CSJ reports the connection between early trauma 
and later outcomes is, nevertheless, repeated and emphasised through illustration; suggesting 
that it is less scientific veracity that policy makers seek than legitimised ‘knowledge’ that can 
be used in the articulation of a credible subject of policy and narrative construction. 
It is thus the formation of a ‘new policy knowledge’ of neuroscience through 
processes of translation that is the condition of these articulations. In this translation, we have 
already seen that the work of think tanks plays a central role, as do reports from other 
boundary-spanning organisations, such as the Royal Society’s ‘Brainwaves’ project  (Royal 
Society 2011). In translation, not only are debates and ambiguity within the scientific field 
elided, but we see this neurologically justified narrative begin to circulate as an element 
separate from the condition of its production. So, we see it stated as something like a policy 
principle that ‘Children's future attainment, wellbeing, happiness and resilience are 
profoundly affected by the quality of their experiences during early childhood’ (DfE 2011).  
Moreover, neuroscience is used not only to justify the identification of policy 
‘problems’, but also to justify spending on those problems, on the basis of principles of 
economic efficiency
1
. This can be seen, literally, in the covers of two reports produced by the 
Early Intervention Review Team. The cover of the first of these reports (2011b, quoted 
above) shows two brains under the title ‘3 year old children’: one large brain, labelled 
‘Normal’, and one smaller brain labelled ‘Extreme Neglect’ (Allen 2011b). An even more 
dramatic choice between early intervention and numerous social ills is presented in the 
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second review report (Allen 2011a), which shows ‘Costs to taxpayer’ of the ‘normal’ brain as 
one gold bar labelled ‘Early Intervention’, in contrast to the ‘Severe neglect’ brain which is 
accompanied by a number of gold bars labelled ‘teen pregnancy’, ‘shorter life’, ‘violent 
crime’ and other social problems (Allen 2011a). The crudeness of this illustration belies the 
significance of its message to readers; the cover emphasises the potential risks of not 
investing in early intervention through a direct link between a smaller brain and negative 
social outcomes. In the text of the report, the risk is explained further in comments on the 
need for early assessment: 
 [Assessment] for each child at this stage in order to catch and pre-empt any dysfunction 
which, if left unattended, would potentially result in massive remedial expenditure 
throughout an individual’s lifetime. In this way, we can begin to put monetary values on 
the consequences of making or not making effective early interventions, which is the 
crucial task in achieving the massive savings on offer from the right investments in Early 
Intervention. (Allen 2011a, 16) 
Here the insights from neuroscience lead logically to demands for early intervention as a 
cost-saving exercise: the ‘massive savings on offer’ can be discussed because of the 
definitive connections neuroscience has ‘revealed’ between early experience and later 
difficulties. A narrative of efficiency is re-inscribed by neuroscience which has a reassuring 
role in that it suggests money spent on early intervention projects will inevitably save money 
in the long term, because the brain and its manifestations in terms of behaviour are 
scientifically predictable.  
This illustration of the neuroessentialist translation of neuroscience in one specific 
policy area demonstrates the interconnected effects of the articulation of a new knowledge. 
The construction of particular policy problems runs alongside the constitution of some 
children as different subjects of policy, while ‘insights’ are used to justify spending priorities. 
Through the use of neuroscience, policy makers are empowered to take action: to reduce 
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expenditure; to intervene in the family; and to prevent the potential negative effects of the 
family environment.  
While this illustration can be seen as based on the revised subject as biological, our 
second illustration, on network theory, can be seen as largely relational.  
Network theory 
This illustration relates to the new knowledge of network theory, which, simply put, has been 
used to suggest that what others do has a strong influence over our individual choices, and 
seeks to understand that influence. Academic interest in social networks has exponentially 
increased over the last two decades, including in education (Daly 2012, 5). Meanwhile, 
within the UK context different agencies and think tanks have engaged in a series of 
translational policy moves that have social networks as a foundational principle, offering new 
insights on the subject of policy, economics and governance.  
In a report of their Social Brain Project, the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) argues that 
‘our brains should be understood as extended and relational nervous systems, always 
functioning within social systems and utilising cultural tools’ (Rowson 2011, 3), noting that 
the independent rational chooser who seeks to maximise profit is ‘a very partial account of 
who we are’ (Rowson 2011, 12). Arguing for the relevance of this line of thought to 
economics, Ormerod, writing for the think tank the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR), claims that ‘network effects are a driving force of behaviour…[that] can have far 
greater influence on behaviour than incentives’ (Ormerod 2012, 30). Dolphin and Nash, 
writing in the same IPPR collection argue that such a revision of economic theory has 
implications for the design of effective policy interventions:  
the more knowledge we have of how people are connected on the relevant network, of 
who might influence whom and when, the more chance a policy has of succeeding. This 
means a move away from ‘mechanistic’ policy tool which ‘tend to treat economic actors 
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in isolation and are unable to anticipate “network effects” within the economic system’ 
(Dolphin and Nash 2012, 11).  
In this illustration we again see the constitution of the irrational subject as a new policy 
problem and of the social network as a new site of intervention. The social network is 
represented as an object of knowledge that allows the prediction and alteration of problematic 
‘network effects’ through changing modes of governance. In seeking to ‘alter the structure of 
existing networks’ (Dolphin and Nash 2012, 11), it is argued the state assumes a revised role, 
becoming a ‘relational state’ (Cooke and Muir 2012, 7) rather than a ‘delivery’ focussed 
service provider to individuals. The ‘Troubled families’ agenda illustrates the translation of 
network theory (among other things) within social and education policy and its influence. 
Troubled Families 
In the aftermath of the riots in England during the summer of 2011, social networks quickly 
came to be positioned as part of the explanation for the widespread nature of these social 
disturbances. Media reports from the time cited technologically enabled social networking 
processes – specifically the use of Blackberry Messenger – as a means of ‘organisation’ of 
the riots (The Economist 11/08/2011). Shortly after the events the UK policy think tank the 
Institute for Government made explicit explanatory links between the spread of the riots and 
network effects:  
Networks can magnify the effect of an initial change or offset it - they can make the 
effect of a policy much more unpredictable and less replicable - because the effects 
depend on what part of the network a policy "hits". The recent London riots showed the 
importance of network effects: it was not the size of the initial disturbance which 
determined how far the disorder would spread, but the extent to which those involved 
were linked to others in different parts of the city. (Institute for Government 2011) 
The availability of a notion of social networks as the significant enabling condition for 
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widespread social disruption from seemingly small events reflects the fact that this is a field 
that increasingly has seen its ideas articulated within policy discourses.  
The Riots, Communities and Victims panel was set up by the Coalition Government 
to investigate the unrest, and highlighted poor parenting as a root cause (The Guardian 
3/05/2012). Lead by social intervention guru Louise Casey, the Troubled Families 
programme was subsequently positioned as a solution to the apparent epidemic dangers of 
unstable families, aimed at helping the 120,000 ‘troubled families’ in England. The 
government represented troubled families ‘as those experiencing problems including 
crime/anti-social behaviour, school exclusion or truancy and living on benefits’ (BBC News 
4/03/2013). The discussion around the implementation of such a programme was also framed 
in financial terms, including the claim in a report by New Philanthropy Capital (van 
Poortvliet 2012, 2) that these families cost the taxpayer up to £9billion per year. This meant 
that implementing an intensive intervention to ‘turn round every troubled family in the 
country’ could also potentially represent savings to the government. However, beyond the 
standard neoconservative emphasis on parenting, and the late neoliberal conception of the 
value of family in terms of return on investment, family is further (re)articulated as a network 
component. 
Claims in the IPPR report that ‘it is real-life social networks – such as family, friends, 
colleagues… [that] shape our preferences and beliefs’ (Ormerod 2012, 29) are mirrored in the 
Troubled Families report (Casey 2012b, 2012a). In the latter, families are conceived as a 
nodal point within networks with the potential to alter the flow of influence and behaviour: 
Families often seemed to stay close to former partners, members of their ex-partner’s 
families or people that they have had problems with. These extended networks of family 
and friends appeared to be very powerful influencers and were often detrimental forces – 
for example, reinforcing non co-operation with agencies, or their sense of being victims 
themselves and so on. (Casey 2012b, 2)  
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In this articulation of the Troubled Families programme we see the new knowledge of 
networks deployed to reconstitute the local scale in policy representations. Under New 
Labour, sociological conceptions of ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000) were dominant in the 
representation of local social relations in the civic realm. Formulations of local social capital, 
that included family structures, social trust, and community engagement, as a largely 
unambiguous good (Performance and Innovation Unit 2002) provided impetus for area-based 
regeneration policy programmes such as the ‘new deal for communities’ during the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Lawless 2006). In the reformulation of the family as a network 
component, the individual policy subject in their limited rationality and self-knowledge 
becomes vulnerable to the negative influence of the network on their values and behaviour 
(which they further unwittingly transmit to those around them).  
As a corollary, the social network is constituted as a site of policy intervention. Instead of a 
system of incentives or threats at the level of the individual as a means of governing 
behaviour, a network policy approach aims to penetrate networks, identifying and restoring to 
order cells that are sources of wider negative influence, and to changing flows of influence by 
understanding and reshaping network connections. Thus, in The Troubled Families 
Programme, we see described: 
Extended family networks, traditionally viewed in society as positive influencers, in these 
cases tended to be characterised by instability and chaos, (Casey 2012b, 48, our 
emphasis) 
 
The impression of families’ isolation from more ‘normal’ or positive friends or networks 
came across strongly. While many families moved around from one place to another 
fleeing violence, others had never left the area they had grown up in. Their partners came 
from the same street or moved between women in the area. They tended to stick within a 
network of other dysfunctional peers. (Casey 2012b, 50, our emphasis) 
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Overall, the Troubled Families policies illustrates the significance of network theory in 
current policy-making as an intervention that, based on the sociality and connectivity of the 
subject, aims at shaping its environment as the main path towards social change. 
Well-being 
Our final illustration relates to ‘well-being’, a term that has risen to prominence in UK 
politics particularly during the term of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government. This new knowledge most clearly relates to the field of ‘positive psychology’ 
identified with the work of Martin Seligman (2003).  In common with our other illustrations 
‘well-being’ has been subject to processes of translation within policy making contexts 
through the production of highly consumable texts by UK think-tanks and a prominent 
policy-oriented academic. This illustration focuses on the constitution of the subject’s relation 
to the self as a site of intervention, whereby the young person subject is articulated in terms 
of the abstracted measurement of emotional states and capacities that, with strong echoes of 
the logic of ‘smart investment’ seen elsewhere, have a statistical correlation with adult 
outcomes. As in other illustrations, this translation enables the construction of a justificatory 
narrative in policy, this time for the establishment of a market of ‘social investment’ in youth 
services. 
In 2010, the Coalition Government commissioned the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) to begin measuring levels of ‘well-being’ in the UK population, a move which is part 
of a minor transnational trend in Western policy making (Fox 2012, OECD 2011). In a 
speech announcing the new measure, Prime Minister David Cameron described it as an 
attempt to enable a ‘rational debate’ about what makes for a better society (Cameron 2010). 
Present at this speech, among other academics, was Lord Layard whose popular book 
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Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (Layard 2011) argues for policy makers to utilise 
economic models that incorporate measures of subjective well-being or ‘happiness’.  
A number of prominent UK policy think-tanks, including The Young Foundation, the 
New Economics Foundation and New Philanthropy Capital, have also made sustained efforts 
of translation, defining well-being, setting out its measurement, summarising existing 
research for policy makers, and arguing for its usefulness in policy-making. The New 
Economics Foundation (Stoll, Michaelson, and Seaford 2012) describe ‘happiness’ as 
combination of individual psychological capacities and subjective experience that are 
measurable  (typically through self-reports of life-satisfaction undertaken through surveys) 
and thus quantifiable and comparable (Stoll, Michaelson, and Seaford 2012). In this same 
vein, The Young Foundation report The State of Happiness describes how such 
measurements can be applied within economic modelling and applied to policy 
implementation (Bacon et al. 2010). Indeed, much of the policy discourse on well-being is 
framed by the tenet that the creation of a measurement of subjective well-being marks a point 
where public policy can move from articulating improvement in well-being as a ‘broad and 
unfocused goal’ (Bacon et al. 2010) to more specific and targeted correlations and 
interventions. Allied to this development, is the production of a number of ‘tools’ and guides 
for the local measurement of wellbeing, including for youth service providers to assess the 
young people they work with and the impact of their intervention on wellbeing (Mguni and 
Bacon 2010, Michaelson, Mahony, and Schifferes 2012, New Philanthropy Capital 2012). 
These tools offer self-report surveys and data analysis techniques for the production of 
representations of the well-being of young people, and they have rapidly expanded in number 
in recent years (Harlock 2013).  
In youth policy, the use of such tools has been articulated within a justificatory 
narrative for the introduction of new forms of ‘social investment’ (a notion that has also had 
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rising prominence in policy discourse during the same period (Bovaird 2014)) in the youth 
services sector. Positive for Youth was the major statement of the Coalition Government’s 
youth policy, described as a ‘single plan’ drawn from the range of policy interventions across 
Government departments (HM Government 2011, Secretary of State Foreword). Having 
appeared several times in a series of consultation documents that preceded Positive for Youth 
in terms of the need for youth services, ‘positive subjective well-being’ is articulated in the 
full publication as part of a critique of the youth service sector’s ability to demonstrate impact 
and thus justify investment: 
A long-standing weakness of out-of-school and college services for young people has 
been their limited ability to measure and demonstrate their impact. The Government is 
committed to supporting local commissioners and providers of services for young people 
to better understand and demonstrate the difference that services make in the lives of 
young people. (HM Government 2011, 83) 
To this end the Coalition Government committed itself to funding a consortium of 
organisations called Catalyst that included the Young Foundation to: 
‘develop a framework of outcomes for young people. It is hoped that this will become an 
‘industry standard’ common language for the outcomes that services for young people 
are aiming to deliver... It will aim to develop greater awareness of the evidence that links 
a number of key personal capabilities (such as confidence and agency, or resilience and 
determination) to key longer-term outcomes such as those relating to educational 
attainment and employment.’ (HM Government 2011, 83-84) 
The reference to confidence, agency, resilience and determination clearly cites the discourse 
of well-being, and later there is a commitment to ‘measuring success’ of youth services 
nationally in terms of, among other things, ‘a new national measure of young people’s 
wellbeing that will be recorded as part of the Measuring National Wellbeing Programme 
commissioned by the Prime Minister’ (HM Government 2011, 87). Catalyst was eventually 
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succeeded in the sector by the Centre for Youth Impact, which brought together a range of 
‘outcomes frameworks’ including that developed by Catalyst, alongside alternatives 
catalogues by the government’s Cabinet Office (The Centre for Youth Impact 2015). 
It is notable in the quote immediately above that an ‘outcome’ does not simply 
describe a measurable difference to aspects of the personality of a young person that might be 
attributable to the adult intervention. Rather, it is specifically a difference that can be 
correlated with ‘longer-term outcomes’. With clear echoes of Allen’s report on early 
intervention policy cited above, though articulated through a different knowledge, the 
narrative of progress for youth services is constituted through the idea that through outcomes, 
youth services might reconstitute themselves as a site of ‘smart investment’. Positive for 
Youth makes clear that central government will not specify for local authorities the level or 
mix of funding of youth services but it argues local authorities should ‘prioritise early 
intervention for disadvantaged young people; and…avoid service reductions which may leave 
young people at risk of poor outcomes and drive up the costs of specialist services in future 
years’ (HM Government 2011, 74).  
This illustration of policy demonstrates a significant shift in the figure of the young 
subject within neoliberal youth policy discourses. Under the Coalition Government, youth 
services have gone from being conceived as a service which supplies outputs to a vehicle for 
investment in young people’s outcomes. New Labour youth policy in the 2000’s had made 
consistent representations of young people ‘as rational individual subjects with ‘voice’ and 
‘choice’’ (Bradbury, McGimpsey, and Santori 2013). The conception of outcomes in Positive 
for Youth figures the young person not as the rational choosing individual within a local 
service offer, indeed not as an individual at all, but as an abstracted measurement of 
emotional development, as a quantitative point in a statistical correlation with projected 
future outcomes. Such a quantitative point, produced through particular legitimated means, 
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enables a value exchange within reconstituted monetary flows (payment by results, social 
impact bonds, and altered reporting arrangements with charitable funders) – in other words, 
the calculation of return on investment.  
Local government administrations in England and Wales, apparently unpersuaded by 
the case for a return on investment, have reduced spending on services for young people 
significantly and at a rate faster than any other area of children and young people’s services 
(DfE 2014, 2015). The central government minister responsible described it as ‘disappointing 
that local [authorities] are making the choice to cut youth services’ while arguing that central 
government’s role was to promote the understanding of youth services’ value for money via 
impact on outcomes ‘through programmes such as the Centre for Youth Impact’ (Offord 
2015).  
This articulation of the new knowledge of well-being in turn sees youth services as 
refocused on this policy problem of the young person’s relation to themselves – their sense of 
optimism, their sense of agency, and their satisfaction with themselves, peers, and 
institutions. Young people are reconstituted as a particular policy problem, the problem of 
measurements that do not correlate with indicators of satisfactory adult outcomes. The figure 
of the rational, choosing young person is transmuted into a statistical risk factor in the 
production of future costs to the state. Youth services, through related technologies of 
funding and impact measurement, are reregulated as a technology of intervention, 
measurement and evaluation with respect the emotional lives of young people which subject 
young people (in the particular sense of subjectivation) to the regulatory norms of well-being. 
The rational subject as object of a new knowledge 
Each of these illustrations is a specific translation involving a distinct ‘new 
knowledge’ within education and youth policy, specific articulations of education policy 
subjects, and enabling particular interventions with their own narrative justifications. 
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However, in working across these illustrations (and bearing in mind the further example of 
behavioural economics), a relatively common process of translation can be discerned and a 
common purpose at the level of political strategy. These are not multiple examples of the 
same revision of the rational subject of neoliberal policy. Nevertheless each is an adaptation 
of the subjectivating force of policy that serves to maintain the legitimacy and control of the 
neoliberal policy regime. Such adaptability is recognised as an historic feature of 
(neo)liberalism (Ong 2006; Peck 2010), and is a particularly important critical focus in the 
emergence of the ‘late neoliberal’ phase of policy making that has followed of the economic 
crisis of 2008 (McGimpsey 2016).  
The processes of translation by which new knowledges are produced in policy 
contexts are complex, incorporating discursive elements, networks of people and 
organisations, and the material production of highly consumable texts, books, events and 
talks. These translations are effective in diverse areas of education and youth policy, 
illustrated here through early years, family services and youth services.  
Translation is more than a series of examples, however.  
Each illustration involves a  revision of the rational subject of policy, with each 
particular irrationality constitutive of sites of policy intervention. In the illustration of 
neuroscience, the private familial domain has become the determinant of the neurological 
development of the child. Parental care and the parents’ skills, knowledge, employment status 
are a reconstituted site of intervention in the biological development of the child’s brain on 
this basis. Network theory is used to constitute particular nodes – troubled families – as sites 
of the production and spread of bad outcomes, beliefs and values throughout identified 
communities through relational connections. With respect to well-being, the psychological 
capacities and self-perceptions of subjects are constituted as the site of intervention by 
education and welfare services. Each such site delineates a limit to the subject’s rationality 
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that can and should be acted upon, in turn implying the development and application of 
particular technologies of governance. These new knowledges constitute new governmental 
possibilities, and collectively alter the subjectivating force of education and youth policy 
discourse. 
The systematic discursive formation of irrational subjects of policy through 
translations of new knowledges is, we argue, a feature of education and youth policy making 
at this time. And by ‘this time’ we mean to suggest that it is significant that these translations 
follow the financial crisis of 2008, after which policy-making in post-industrial nations have 
undergone a thematic ‘change of emphasis’ (Ball 2012). Translation and its relation to the 
articulation of the subject of policy occurs in the aftermath of the traumatic exposure of the 
contradictions of neoliberalism in the financial crisis and subsequent fiscal austerity, which 
has required significant policy discursive work (among other things) to restore legitimacy 
(Clarke and Newman 2012).  
As such, whether translations affect the family, the social network, individual 
psychology, they do not signify a move from a rational subject of policy to a particular 
irrational one, but figure a multiplicity of irrational subjects of policy, indeed a multiply 
irrational subject of policy, that functions to explain a series of persistent social and economic 
problems, constitute sites of state intervention, and justify the combination of laissez-faire 
market approaches with authoritarian centralisation.  
As such, new knowledges of the irrational subject do not directly challenge and 
supplant a liberal orthodoxy of the rational subject. This multiplicity of subjects is productive 
in conjunction with neoliberal orthodoxies. The effect is less an oppositional confrontation, 
and more a diversification: different narratives become possible, different regulatory 
technologies are developed and deployed, and there are methodological shifts in education 
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and youth policy making as economic theory is adjusted to incorporate a range of new 
assumptions about human nature and their individual choosing behaviours.  
The essentialism of classical economics that neoliberalism subsequently utilised in its 
strategies of governance and subjectivation is not giving way to an alternative subject. 
However, repeated translations of new knowledges produce the effect of a modulation, a 
plasticity ; that is to say, to a tropic process of moulding the subject into the shape of policy 
problems.
2
 As we have noted throughout this article, and following in the education policy 
sociological tradition, policy discourse is bound up in processes subjectivation, of 
constituting the subjects it addresses (Ball 2006b). Thus a change in the terms by which 
policy discourse addresses the subjects of policy entails a modification in its force of 
subjectivation. And if the cumulative effect of a process of multiple translations of new 
knowledges is a certain plasticity, then perhaps we might refer to a ‘plastic subject’ not to 
denote a specific subject  as the alternative to the rational subject of neoliberalism, but as a 
quality of policy subjectivation at this time.   
Conclusion – the plastic subject of late neoliberal policy 
This paper has explored the translation of knowledges from emerging scientific fields within 
education and youth policy. These translations are, we argue, inevitably linked to the 
representations of policy subjects, and as such to alterations to the productive, subjectivating 
force of policy. And we suggest that such an alteration, which diversifies the subject of policy 
as a site of governance, intervention and control may be no coincidence in the aftermath of 
financial crisis. The financial crisis and the aftermath of ‘austerity’ have seen an authoritarian 
reassertion of the neoliberal regime, which inevitably exposes troubling (for power) 
contradictions. The individual of ‘liberal paternalism’ who must be ‘nudged’ to make good 
choices rather than left to their own flawed decisions (Bradbury, McGimpsey, and Santori 
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2013); the child and parents must be the site of intervention or they will be fundamentally 
damaged in neurological terms; the ‘troubled family’ must be managed to reduce their impact 
on others in their network; and the young person must be numerically evaluated in terms of 
well-being – each entails a fusion of knowledge and policy making that is indicative of an 
intensified governing need for a simultaneity of centralised control and the (neoliberal) 
cultural legitimacy of individualised autonomy and responsibility.   
Thus both rationality and irrationality co-exist in translational policy texts, which tend 
to emphasise improving existing policy-making. This argument coheres with long-standing 
discussions of the endurance of neoliberalism as a regulatory regime being contingent on its 
ability to mutate (Ong 2006). As Peck puts it, ‘as far as neoliberalism ‘survives’, it does so 
through continued mongrelisation’ (Peck 2010, 24), a plurality underpinned by ‘practices of 
de- and re-articulation’ and appropriation (Clarke 2008, 139).  
There remains a question of the significance of these changes, and what they say 
about neoliberal governance following the financial crisis. At one level, these translations 
involve revision to the policy tools deployed, the sites of intervention, the roles policy-
makers play, policy networks, and the constitutive force of policy brought to bear on those 
subjects policy addresses. At another level, there is a further question as to whether these 
translations collectively entail a more fundamental change to policy making. Is this diversity 
and flexibility a characteristic of a wider change?  
In recent years there have been academic discussions emphasising relatively radical 
discontinuity from neoliberalism. Some discussions of ‘post-neoliberalism’ have centred on 
optimistic analyses of an era ‘after neoliberalism’ emerging from the mid-90s, for instance in 
Latin America (Macdonald and Rückert 2009, Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). In post-
industrial nations, the financial crash sparked discussion of a ‘crisis of neoliberalism’ in the 
2000s (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2010, Brand and Sekler 2009). Our analysis works 
25 
 
instead in a tradition of education policy scholarship that recognises change as characteristic 
of the neoliberal regime (Doherty 2015), or what Peck et al call the ‘necessary 
incompleteness of neoliberalism’ (2010). It makes sense from this perspective to recognise a 
change of ‘phase’ (McGimpsey 2016) of policy making as part of the survival strategy of 
neoliberalism during the post-crash era when legitimacy is threatened much that seemed 
certain is in flux. One effect of that flux felt in education and young policy may be the 
modification of policy discourse through successive translations of new knowledges; a 
modification that in turn shapes the subjectivating force of policy, producing a more plastic 
subject where the rational subject had once seemed so solid.  
Notes 
 
1.  It is of course that case that we illustrate just one policy take-up of neuroscience here. Even 
within Early Years policy, there is evidence of the previous Labour administration undertaking 
similar articulations (for example DCSF 2010).  
2.  This metaphor of plasticity is, indeed, itself an emerging trope of interdisciplinary, flexible 
policy production. Taking up the language of ‘neuroplasticity’ as one of the most influential 
recent discoveries of neuroscience, the RSA’s report Transforming Behaviour Change: Beyond 
Nudge and Neuromania (Rowson 2011) synthesises research from across a wide range of 
disciplines, arguing that in contrast to classical economics and biological interpretations, we 
must understand  that the productive effects of social contexts on cognition and consciousness 
are fundamental to ‘the emerging scientific view of human nature’ (Rowson 2011, 10). 
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